Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 4, number 4 by Jeffrey Nugent
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research




Publication Date: October 1975
Chapter Title: Policy-Oriented Macroeconometric Models for Development and 
Planning
Chapter Author: Jeffrey Nugent
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10416
Chapter pages in book: (p. 509 - 529)Anna/s cf Lcanornie and Social Measurement 4/4, 1975
POLICYORIENTED MACROECONOMETRICMODELS FOR
DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING
BY JEFFREY B. NIJGENT
This paper presents a method for app! vingmacroeconopne(ri models to policy planning through theusc' of linear programming techniques. A smaU-scc,leeconometric model is specfit'd and the,t e'itimtjtc'd
separately for each of the flue countries of CentralAmerica. The models ore fitted together tofornione
large econometric model for the region. Linearprogramming is then applied to solve the optimal set of
macroeconomic policies under two institutional setupsone withoutcoordi,'at ion among countries and
the oilier one with complete coordination. The resultsobtained in these alternative 51(1w: urns indicate
that the potential benefits of policy coordinationamong Central American countries range from 2 to
7 percent of the region's GNP.
The last fifteen years have witnessed dramaticbreakthroughs in the development
of long-termplanning models and of practical criteria forallocating resources
in the imperfect market settings characteristicof most less developed countries
(LDCs). In contrast, the construction anduse of short-term macroeconometrjc
models for policy planning in the LDCcontext remains a relatively primitive and
underdeveloped art form patterned on the earliereconometric models developed in
the more developed countries (MDCs).
In the following section I call attentionto recent developments which are
beginning to improve the fit between themodels utilized and both the character-
istics of LDCs being modelled and the needs of theirpolicy planners. At the same
time I shall speculate on the nature of further improvementsthat will be necessary
before the LDCs can have fully satisfactorymacroeconometric models.
The second section presentsa method for applying macroeconometric
models to policy planning with theuse of linear programming techniques. The
use of the linear programming approach to policy planningis demonstrated in the
context of regional (multinational) policy coordinationamong Central American
countries. A small-scale econometric model isspecified and then estimated
separately for each of the five countries of CentralAmerica. The models are fitted
together to form one large econometric model for theregion. Linear programming
is then applied to the model to solve the optimalset of macroeconomic policies
under the two alternative institutional setupsoncewithout coordination among
countries and once with complete coordination.A comparison of these solutions
provides a measure for the potential benefitsof greater policy coordination. The
paper is concluded with some suggestions for institutionalizingresearch on macro-
econometric modelling of LDCs.
PAST AND FUTURE TRENDS IN MACROECONO1ETRICMODELS
What kind of models should be employed for LDCs? Thisquestion, posed by
Lawrence Klein some ten years ago (Klein, 1965),is still an open one despite some
509serious attemptsduring this decade onthe part of Kleinhimself, several of his
students andcolleagues,and others to ctiggeStsonicanswers.1
As Klein noted,the earliestmacrOecofl0met1cmodels for LDCs, (e.g.,
Narasimbam, 1956;Suits, 1964) werepatterned rather closely tothe simple
Keynesian model thathad been prevalentin the United Statesand other MDCs
in the 1940's and1950'S. Slowly thekindsofmodels proposed for LDCshave
begun to change.Some of the morerecent LDC modelshave paralleled the recent
trendofMDC models towardmore neoclassicalformulations by giving special
emphasis to the role ofrelative prices and toprofit maximation (Zaremhka,1967,
1972; Marwah, 1963,1970) and in makinggreater use ofexpectatiOflal variables
based on distributed lagformulations (EvanS,1970). Other changes in LDCmodels
reflect changes inemphasis of different sectors.While the earlier models were
inspired by the closed economYmodels of Harrod-Dofliarand Keynes. the large
role that foreign tradeplays in most LDCshas become increasinglyreflected in the
more recentmodels.
Some of the recentinnovations in LDCmodels, however, represent more
fundamental breaks withthe tradition of MDCmodels. While the earlier models
were (in theKeynesian tradition)demand-determined, several of the more recent
LDC models have emphasizedsupply considerations(Marwah, 1970; Beltran del
Rio and Klein, 1973).In others disaggregationhas permitted the specificationof
different production andconsumption functions for differentsectors (Islam, 1965:
Agarwala, 1970; Zarembka,1972; Kelley. Williamsonand Cheetham, 1972),
thereby accommodating theN urkse_LeWiSFeiRafliSnotions of agricultural
surplus, and, by admittingvarious kinds of market imperfections somemodels
allow various forms ofdualism to persist. By wayof giving more attention to
detail, the more recent LDCmodels are generally better ablethan their predecessors
to reflect the specialconditions and institutions of theparticular countries for
which they are designed.2
In my opinion, these trends towardgreater differentiationboth between
MDC models, as a whole, andLDC models, as a whole, and betweenand among
different LDC models, individually, aredesirable. Moreover, it is my expectation
that these changes will continueand even accelerate. I believe thatin the next
several years macroeconometric modelsof LDCs will succeed to a much greater
degree in explaining and utilizing asdeterminants variables that haveheretofore
been largely excluded, such as thedemographic factors, structural factors,and the
determinants as well as effects of changes in incomedistribution. Even for any
given LDC I would expect to find an increasingdegree of individuality and differen-
tiation among macroeconometric models to reflectthe increasingly differentiated
uses to which the different models maybe put as well as the different "visions"of
different model builders.
Most of these expected changes are essentially thoseof scope. level of aggrega-
tion and emphasis, and most of these changes are alreadywell on the way to being
accomplished. My concern in this paper is, rather, with severalother areas in
which improvements are necessary hut which are, as yet, not as clearlyfixed on the
l See, especially, del Rio and Klein. 1973.
2 From this point of view, note the rather detailed models of Mexico by Beitan del Rio and Klein.
1973; of India. by Agarwala, 1970: of Argentina. by Nugent. 1967: of Indonesia. by Fukuchi.1973.
510horizon. 'Ihese time: (I) theneed hr developingmore completely and e phdi lv the disequilibriumnature oflevelopnieuutprs)ccss('s and structures, (2) the need for integrating short., mcdiui in-, il 11(1 long-range I lineperspect i yes, a tud (3) t he need to relate these modelsmoic tlost'ly to the reqtuircmeuitsof desclopmeiplanning a ii d policy decisions.
J)ixequifibriup,
We begin with discquilihriuin. More a iidinure economists are Coming to recogna/e that we live in a world whichis less than perfect andin which often he optimal, 'iirstbest," aiideven "seco,id-st" adjustmentmechanism.s cailnot he utilized on grounds ofpolitical or administrajinfeasihility. With opt inial adjustment mechanisms ruledout or iIIipc(Ied by politicalConstraints, and others rejected on economicor social grounds, the many dualisticdilkrences whichare observed between oneSector and another tendto renlain in eflct and insame cases even to become moreexaggerated as time goes on andas developiient takes rilace,' Partly, thismay he the result of faulty policyand, therefore, suggests the need (to he spelled outpresently) forlnacroeconIuetiic niodels of l.DCs capable of yielding more useful policyimplications.I luwever, partly the dualismsalso seem to he due to the relativestrength of various disequilibrati,igforces that seem to appear rat her flat urally in theprocess of economic development.
The failure of prices, technology,savings behavior and humancapital stocks and sectors to comeinto equilibrium is animportant fact of litin LDCs and suggests that very carefulconsideration must he given to thenature and magnit tide of the factors preventingthe attainment ofequilibrium, and the range wit hin which any particularconstraint is binding, I'or example,with respect to the market for an individualCommodity Charactcri/e(j byexcess supply or excess demand, the
failure of prices to adjustto a level at which theexcess supply or demand would he
eliminated constitutesa genuine case of disequilibriuni, Toaiialyie the situation and to propose policiesto deal with it, one must, first, hecertain whether the dis-
equilibrium is of the eXCeSS demandor the excess supply variety and, then, hein a position to understand thereasons for continued disequilibriuniand for the failure of the adjustmentmechanisms to restore cquilihriu,n.
The existence of disequilibriumposes prodigious problems, not onlyfor model building hut also forestimation, Attempts to traceout supply and demand
curves simultaneously hycarefully followingthe ordinary rules for modelidentifica tion will, in general, heinsufficient. liven if thiswere done, participants in the market tinder considerationWould still generally he "off"one of the relevant
curves, not just in the ordinary stochasticsense but consistently in a particular
direction The estimation problemsare, of course, not insuirmotilita ble and, indeed,
Some fairly satisfactory models forovercoming them are alrea(Iy with us.4Most such methods arc basedon identifying whether one is ina position of excess
demand or of excess supplyon the basis of price behavior. But, ifprice behavior
is also stochastic and subjectto other variables (as inprice expectations model
to the observed price changes of previousperiods), such an identificationmay fiOt
This thcniis deetojti thorouIiIy in YoiopouJoatiti Nueiit, fort hctniing
Sce Fuji and JatTcc, 1972; hiir andKdjiin, I74; mid Matidala andNelson, 1974
511be easy to make, particularlyif, as in most LDCs, theprice data series are weak in
quality and limited in quantity.
A second problem thatis raised by the admission ofdisequilibrium in any
particular market or sectorof one's macroeconoflietricmodel is the possibility of
secondary or spillover effects toother market sectors Suppose thatthe disequilib-
rium condition in sectorA is one of excess demand.What will be the reaction of
the consumers of A whosenotional demands are frustrated? Willit be to accumu-
late assets---and if so,what kinds of assets-- or will itbe to buy more in other
sectors? If the latter, in whichother sector(s) will the demand spillovereffects be the
largest? How large will theybe? What policy instrumentsaffect the direction as
well as magnitude of thesespillovers?
Similarly, if there is excess supply, aswith respect to labor or even agricultural
output in the rural sector,how do frustrated suppliers react?Do they cut purchases
from other sectors, and if so.which ones? What happens to the excesssupplies? Are
they consumed at the farm?Are they thrown away? Are theystored for future use?
Do the suppliers migrate? Who arethe ones who migrate? Where do migrants go
and what do they do there?Although these questions have been addressedfre-
quently in the literature of developmenteconomics, clear answers have not yet
been obtained. The dogged adherence toequilibrium formulations in models of
all kinds has, in my opinion, donemuch to delay the achievement of greater
understanding in this respect.
The spillover effects of disequilibrium canbe extremely important and very
powerful, and yet are entirely ignoredin equilibrium models. What happens
when there are several different markets outof equilibrium, e.g., excess supply of
labor in urban areas, excess Supply ofagricultural commodities in rural sectors,
excess demand for foreignexchange and capital in the modern sectors? How do the
various spillover and linkage effects arisingfrom these factors interact? Do they
offset or reinforce each other? Do their effectsmultiply? Answers to these questions
can come only frommacroeconometriC models possessing a general disequilibrium
framework. The need to deal with interdependencies amongmarkets further
accentuates the aforementioned problem ofestimation, as simultaneous equation
estimation techniques must be employed.
The existence of disequilibrium also poses questions ofdynamics. By defini-
tion, the existence of disequilibrium implies that priceadjustments are not in-
stantaneous. But how rapidly do they adjust? Do quantitiesadjust more than
prices? How fast do the quantity adjustments occur? What institutional,policy, and
other variables influence the relati'e as well as absolute speeds of these two typesof
adjustment Given that the equilibrium prices are seldom known, to what informa-
tion do the suppliers and demanders in the different sectors react? Are the reactions
linear or are they nonlinear with respect to the gaps between demand and supply?
Moreover, the scope of disequilibrium analysis in LDCs is not limited to strict
cases of excess demand or supply in the (usually) relatively few marketswhere
prices are set arbitrarily by government agencies. Any market or sector in which
adjustments are either incomplete or less than instantaneous is characterized by
disequilibrium. Disequilibrium is reflected in such diverse phenomena as high
birth rates in rural areas coupled with outward migration to urban areas, an
imported technology which does not fit the factor prices prevailing in LDCs, and a
512
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Lidistribution of income which becomes lessequal as development proceeds. Indeed,
such phenomena are sufficientlypervasive in most LDCs tosuggest that disequi-
librium formulations should becentral to LDC models rather than peripheralto them as at present.
integration of Short, Medium-, and Long-Term Per.spectii'es
Typically, there have been,on the one hand, long-term econometric models,
essentially, growth models, basedon productivity indexes of full-fledged produc-
tion functions and changes thereinover time, and then, in a completely separate
literature, short-term econometricmodels emphasizing the determination ofthe
level and composition ofaggregate demand. Attempts to integrate bothaspects into a single macroeconometricmodel have been rare and superficial. Anotable
exception is the study of the EconomicPlanning Agency, Government of Japan
(1965), which contains the followinginterrelated models: anaggregate long-term
model focusing on saving, net capital formation,and potential output through the
production function; a sectoral long-termmodel, which focuses on the differences
in production functions and laborproductivity between sectors, introduces
foreign trade, and explains the allocationof labor and capital resourcesamong
sectors; a medium-term model, which treats the factorsdetermined in the long-
term models as exogenous variables (particularlysince they were estimated froma
longer data series), determines effectivedemands, prices, wages and income distri-
bution, and traces the effects ofgovernment policy instruments throughout the
system; and finally, the short-term interindustrymodel, which disaggregates the
components of aggregate final demand determined in themedium-term model into
the demands on individual sectorsforeign and domcstic.andcomputes the
labor and capital requirements impliedby these demands. The individual models,
as integrated, are used for making short- and medium-term forecasts.The forecasts
from each model are then compared andrevised, iteratively, until convergence and
consistency are achieved.
Generalizing on the Japanese model,one might suggest that the long-term
models might also be used to identifyparameter shifts that will, in turn, identify
various "epochs" within which theparameters of the medium and short-term
models would be constant but between whichthey would all change.6 Conversely,
the short- and medium-term models mighthelp to identify situations ofexcess
supply or demand which might feed back into thefactor accumulation and other
features of the long-term models. In principle,the individual observations of the
long-term models could be three, five,or even ten-year averages, whereas the
observations for the medium-term models might wellbe annual observations, and
those of short-run models, semi-annualor quarterly observations.
As already noted, the relative importance of demographicfactors, structural
and technological changes in thecase of long-term growth of LDCs, and the
persistence of dualistic differences betweensectors further increases the potential
benefits and importance of integrating the short-, medium-,and long-term con-
siderations in macroeconometrjc models of LDCs. Withoutsuch an integration
5The most well-known examples of such modelsare those of Solow, 1957: Lcnisor,. 1962. 1968:
and Jorgenson and Griliches.
6 Foran application of this technique in a tong-term model see Brown. 1966.
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it will gcnerally be impossible toindicate the implications of alternative macro-
economic policy packages on the variousdevelopmental targets.
Policy Planning
In MDCs the primary usemade of macroeconOrnetric modelshas been for
forecasting. Indeed, it is on thebasis of selling subscriptions totheir forecasts that
MDC model builders have beenable to finance at least partofthe building and
then continuous revision andupdating of their models. Thehypothesis-testing and
policy-implications uses of such modelshave not been fully exploited.
In LDCs the uses of macroecofloflietriCmodels in hypothesis testing and in
drawing policy implications would seem tobe potentiallyofconsiderably greater
importance. Thus far, however,the previously mentioned tend'ncy on the part of
LDC model builders to follow in thefootsteps of their MDC pi edecessors, and the
understandable desire of LDC model builders toshow that their models provide
adequate descriptions of the economiesfor which they were designed, have
combined to limit the usefulness of LDCmodels in these respects.
These shortcomings are traceable to thefollowing procedures with respect to
the inclusion of policy instrumentsand the way in which they are treated. First,
perhaps because the government hastraditionally played a much smaller role in
resource allocation andaccumulation in MDCs than in LDCs, the tendency to
replicate MDC models has resulted in anunfortunate underrepresentation of the
role of macroeconomic policy instruments.Second, in those relatively few models
in which the policy instruments have beenintroduced sufficiently, the details are
either excessively abundant so that, for lack of an apparatusfor integrating them,
few overall conclusions can be drawn, or tooinsufficient to be of practical relevance
to policy makers who must makequantitative decisions with respect to rather
specific taxes and kinds of expenditures. Third, frequentlythe policy instruments
included have been treated as endogenous variables, for example, asfunctionsof
time or income.7 Fourth, the short-term perspectiveof most LDC models may
have dissuaded model builders from including in theirmodels some important
policy instruments merely because the valuesofthese instruments have changed
only very slowly or at very infrequent intervals, thereby makingit difficult to
obtain quantitative assessments of their impact.
Naturally, when the policy instruments are either excluded altogether, or
included but only on an ad hoc basis (e.g., when convenient for forecasting purposes)
or as endogenous variables, valid implications for policy cannotbe drawn.
The Use of International Cross-Section !vfodels
Actually all of the shortcomings indicated in existing macroeconometric
models of LDCs are interrelated, and most of them are traceable in the final analysis
Our quarrel is not with endogenization of policy variables. p'r Se. Indeed, one can but applaud
serious excursion into political economy such as that by Marzouk. 1970 wherein pohcy variables are
explained in terms of the relative power of different socio-economic-political groups. 1-loweser, the
specification of policy instruments as functions of time would seem to provide little in the way of
benefits as far as explanatory power, specification error, etc. are concerned at the expense of weakening
the ability to draw policy conclusions from the model.
514to data limitations-in particular, the brevity ofthe period for which comparable
time series data are available forany individual country. The lack of data explains
why the most interesting developmentmodels are often simulation models.8
However, not being subject to the formalruics of parameter eatiluatiun, and lacking
any objective means for evaluating the adequacy of theformulation, simulation
models--no matter how interesting theymight beare hardly likely to be suffici-
ently convincing to influence policy.
Our excessive relianceon equilibrium assumptions and processes is toa
large extent attributable to the fact thatsuch assumptions permit one to avoid the
interdependencies and linkages of spillover effectsand the complexities of partial
adjustment processes that arise in situationsin which markets and processesare
out of equilibrium. The existence of disequilibrium,as pointed out above, raises
numerous questions that can be answered only ifmore and better data are available.
So, too, the preoccupation inmacroeconometric models of L[)Cs with short-
term considerations and their failure to integratelong-term ones and to derive the
policy implications that could be used bydevelopment planners stem, toa large
extent, from the relatively few annual observationsavailable and the lack of
perceptible change in some important policy instrumentswithin the period of the
sample observations.
Supplementary econometric models estimatedon the basis of international
cross-section data for LDCs alone,or for MDCs and LDCs together, could
constitute a valuable means of obtainingestimates of some of the longer-term
relationships, of some of the more elusive elementsof disequilibrium, and of the
impacts of policy instruments whichmay not have been exercised actively in
many LDCs in the short time period for which dataare available. Naturally, such
efforts are only supplementary; thereasons for the failure of cross-section estimates
to hold necessarily for time series situations,or of "average" relationships ob-
tained from a collection of countryexperiences to hold for individual countries,
are well known.
Nevertheless, the use of estimates obtained frominternational cross-section
analysis is already commonplace ina number of different aspects of development,
most of which are relevant as far as macroeconometric modelsof development are
concerned. For example, structural changesare usually estimated from international
cross-section data and are generally found to be validover time (Chenery and
Taylor, 1968). Similarly, the determinants ofaggregate exports, the composition of
exports, and the relative benefits of trade and aid have all beenvery profitably
studied from international cross-section data (Cohen andSisler, 1971 ; Chenery and
Strout, 1966: Naya, 1965; De Vries, 1967; Ooms,1966; Nugent, 1974). Several
studies have estimated aggregate andeven sectoral production functions and
measured the impact of capital formation, population growth, humancapital, and
trade in a growth accounting frameworkon the basis of international cross-
secticn data (Hagen and Hawrylyshyn, 1969; Sommers andSuits, 1971 ; Kuznets,
1966; Krueger, l968).
8 Forsome interesting applications of simulation models see Holland with Gillespie, 1963.and
Shubik, 1966.
Adelman and Morris, 1968. have gone so far as to estimate the parameters ofa socio'politicat-
economic model of development from international cross section data.
515Indeed, all that nceds to bedone is'to specifyasomewhat more complete
model that would integratethesevariousphenomenathat have heretofore been
looked at separately and often in anad hoe manner.
Individual efforts at macroeconometrtcmodel building generate externalities
which can at least partially be capturedby cooperation among teams of researchers
in different countries and teamsof researchers working on international cross
sections of time series.
APPLICATION or MACROECONOMETRICMoImLs TO Poricy PLANNING AND
COORDINATION: THE CASE OFCENTRAL AMERICA
Another justitication for supplementingnational econometric models with
international efforts or even internationalmodels is economic interdependence
among major trading partners, orcountries among which resources flow relatively
freely. If economies are interdependent,indirectly each country is affected by the
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Tri/NxTax Rate on Imports
TelExTax Rate on Exports
ToIGDP"Other' Tax Rate
ZcmDummy Variable for Membership in
Customs Union
C. Other Symbols
Symbol Definition A Over a variable ind!cates estimate
of that variable derived from another
equation
Supercript indicates country
C or CR Costa Rica
E or ES El Salvador
G or GIJGuatemala
H or 110Honduras
N or NI Nicaragua
CM or Central America
CACM
other country's exogenous variables, including its policy instruments. Such inter-
dependencies have provided the motivation for large-scale cooperative efforts in
macroeconometric model building at the international level, especially in Project
LINK. lithe eflects of one country's economic policieson another and vice versa
can be assessed quantitatively, the interdependent countries may be induced to
coordinate their policies and thereby better achieve their development goals.
In this section I will describe a small-scale effort to estimate these inter-
dependencies in Central America, which, as the result of the establishment of the
customs union known as the Central American Common Market, has achieved a
considerable degree of economic interdependence. The potential use of macro-
econometric models in policy planning is illustrated with respect to the optimal
policy choices for the Central American countries, first in the absence of policy
coordination among countries, and then again with complete coordination of





Tn Import Tax Receipt5
Te Export Tax Receipts
To Other Tax Receipts net of Transfers
from Government to the Private Sector
CR Stock of Credit to the Private Sector
MS Money Supply (stock)
BP Balance of Payments
SO Government Savings
TNET Total Tax Receipts net of Transfers to
the Private Sector
SrmhlVarihle
Dummy Variable for Completion of
Integration Highways
TIMETime (in years)
TT Terms of Trade Adjustment
NF YNet Factor Income from Abroad
Nus Index of United States Imports
POP Population
P Index of Domestic Prices
Symbol Definition
Subscript - I. indicates time period
indicates desired
C indicates expected
D before a variable (as in DRM.
DM5. DCR) indicates first dilT-
erencee.g.,(RM, - RM,_1), etc.
LPI Individual Country Linear Pro-
gramming Model (without co-
ordination)




maximum incomeattainable for theregion as a whole (and for the individual
countries of the rcgion) anestimate of thepotential benefits of policy coordination
among countriesof the region isobtained.
Since our purpose hereis strictly to illustratethe possible use of econometric
models for policy planningand coordination, themodel itself and the presentation
of the model andmethods utilized are assimple and concise as possible. The
interested reader isreferred elsewhere (Nugent,1974) for details. As the reader can
see by referring toTable 1, the model utilizedis of the relatively naive Keynesian
type, and thereforeits usefulness is entirelylimited to the short run. The models
utilized consist of separatemacroecOflometric models of each Central American
country composedof 17 equations in 17 endogenousvariables specified uniformly
for all countries.'0 Thefive models are interrelatedby the intraregional export
variables of each country 1,El1, which are influenced by the level of intraregional
imports in each othercountryj of the region,NP. There are six policy instruments
in each country: governmentconsumption G, government investment Ig, reserve
money RM, and the tax rates onimports Tn/Nx, on exports TelEx and on income
To/GDP.
Estimates of the structural equationsfor each country were obtained by two
stage least squares. Theresults obtained for Costa Rica and El Salvador are presented
as examples in Tables2A and 2B.
Because of the fact that investment isdirectly affected by lagged endogenous
variables, and that thereby almost allthe endogenous variables are indireciji'
affected by such variables, the model allows oneto analyze the effects of the policy
instruments not only on the variables of the currentperiod but also on those of
future periods. Since, in the formation of themodel, no lags of greater length than
one year were employed, mostof these dynamic interconnections between policy
instruments and other variables will have begun to be felt within two years. For
this reason, and in order to keep the model as simple as possible and not to extend
it beyond its admittedly short-run capabilities, we have expanded the model so as
to include only two periods (years). This doubles the number of equations to 34 per
country (except for Costa Rica and Honduras, which lack credit equations). These
systems of 34 equations per country can alternatively be treated as separate models
or can be fitted together to make one big model for Central America, consisting of
34 x 5 or 170 equations. Adding the following identities for each of the two periods
yields for Central America as a whole a complete system consisting of 178 equations.
(171-2) GDPCACMGDPCR + GDPES + GDPGLGDPHO + GDPNI





(177-8) NV =El' + transport costs between countries
i=i ' for each year land! + 1.
10 By multiplyingthe values of these other predetermined variables by the relevant reduced form



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)This system of 178 equations isof the form:
(a)IY = AY -t- 8X
where Y is the vector of 178endogenous variables and X isa vector of 98 predeter-
mined variables anda constant term A and Bare matrices of dimensions178 x 178 and 178 x 99, respectively, The solutionto this system is given by:
(b)Y= A)'BX.
Th!s system of equationsmay he cafled the reduced form of the model because
each of the 178 endogenousvariables contained in Y is expressedas a linear func- tion of the 99 predeterminedvariables on/v. (The constantterm is treated as a
"variable" whose value is fixedat 1.0.)
When the necessary calculationsare carried out on the A and B matrices
from any of the three models whoseresults were reported above,a 176 x 99 set
of reduced-form coefficients isobtained. Such a matrix of coefficientsexpresses in
quantitative terms the impacts of each ofthe 99 predetermined variableson each
of the 178 endogenous variables. Sincemany of the endogenous variables are of
only secondary interest, and sincea number of the predetermined variablesare
not policy instruments, there isno need for us to be concerned with the entire
matrix of reduced-form coefficients.
We concentrate insteadon the reduced form coefficients of each of the six
policy instrumentsG, 1g. RM,Tn/Nx, Te/Ex, and To/GDPon five of themore
important target variables, i.e., GNP,private consumption (C), investment (1),
government savings (SG), and the balance ofpayments (BP). As an example of
these results, in Table 3 we present theset of reduced-form coefficients representing
the impact of a one percent change in theincome and sales (referred to in the model
as "other" taxes) tax rates on three of the target variables(GNP, SG, and BP) in
each country, for each of the two timeperiods, land t + 1.
Although the primary impact of changesin the policy instruments is felt
in the country in which tFe action istaken, it should be clear from these results
that the policy changes do havevery substantial effects in the other countries of
the CACM. It is not surprising to findout that the spreading effects on the other
countries tend to be greater in thecase of Honduras and Nicaragua, the countries
with the greatest intraregional trade deficits.Another characteristic revealed in
the results of Table 3 is that the impact ofthese policy changes is not confined to
a single time period. Indeed, in many instances the laggedeffects of the policy
changes are as great oreven greater than the immediate effects.
With these estimates of the effects of thepolicy instruments and otherpre-
deterniined variables on the target variablesover time (year r and t + 1) and over
space (on each of the Central American countries), the job ofeconomic analysis
has been completed. This analysis yieldsa matrix M of country, variable, and date--
specific multipliers of the vector of policy instruments,XA, on the vector of
endogenous variables Y in whichwe are interested, Y, namely the five target
variables GNP, C, I, SG and BP. M is thus the relevantpartitioned portion of the
complete reduced form matrix L/A] - 1B.
We may now move to policy analysis, whereinwe reverse the direction of
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targets. Instead of fixed targets, we shall assume that the targets arc flexible and
can be stated in terms of maximization and inequality constraints.
Specifically, we first arbitrarily choose one of the goals in Y1, e.g., GNP, as the
single flexible target to be maximized:
(1) GNP1 --GNP1=Maximum.
Second, for each year, t and t + I, set appropriate constraints on each of the
other target variables: consumption (C), investment (1), the balance of payments






GNP: 1010-15.21 -23.14 -12.19 --747
GNP 511 - 3.83 -11.46 -5.31 -2.41
CostaRica
(INPt -6.96 -0.28 -0.84 -2.96 -0.41
SOt 3.71 --0.03 -0.09 --0.71 -0.05
BP 2.41 -0.06 -0.18 --0.41
GNP: -- -2.87 -0.19 --058 -0.98 -027
SGz .I -0.31 -0.02 -0.08 -0.21 -003
BPr 4-1 0.96 0.02 0.03 -0.46 0.03
El Salvador
GNPr - 1.22 - 14.08 -- 1.62 --1.42 -0.79
SO, -0.10 4.69 -0.14 -0.10 --0.07
BPv -0.16 3.72 -0.21 -0.18 -0.10
GNPt + I -0.83 --306 -1.17 -1.05 -0.40
SOt -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 0.03
BPt + I -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
Guatemala
GNPz - 1.45 0.64 -20.06 -2.42 -0.94
SOt -0.14 0.06 7.85 -0.33 -009
BP: -0.24 0.11 5.54 -0.55 -0.16
GNPz + 1 -1.28 -0.46 -9.08 -1.46 -0.67
SGI + I -0.12 -0.04 --0.85 -0.18 -9
RPz+ I -0.07 0.05 2.45 --0.09 -0.08
Honduras
GNP: -0.18 0.08 -0.24 -5.14 -0.12
SO, -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.42 -9.01
BPs -0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.33 -0.03
GNP, + I --0.14 -0.05 -0.20 -1.64 -0.07
SGi + I -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.22 -0.01
BT: + I 0.02 0.01 0.03 --0.19 0.02
Nicaragua
GNPe -0.29 -0.13 -0.38 -0.25 -5.17
SGt -0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 4.04
BP -0.06 0.03 -0.08 --0.06 3.07
GNPt --0.19 -0.06 -0.27 -0.18 -1.01
SOt+ I -0.02 -0.01 -0.74 -0.02 -0.13
BP + I 0.01 -0.66 -- 0.39(BP), and government savings (SG).SpecilIcally,thevalues chosen forthe con-
straints were actual values of thesevariablesfor consecutive recent years for





Third, we include the trade-offs (M) between the instruments (X.1) and the
live target variables Y4. thereby constituting another 5 equations. equations (6) to
for each of the two years.
Fourth. we impose upper and lower bounds on each of the policy instruments
so as to represent political constraints on extreme policy changes. The particular
upper and lower bounds chosen reflect maximum positive and negative changes
from year to year or deviations from the historical trendswhichever seemed most




















Since all of the variables can be scaled (and the constraints and equations
changed accordingly), one can add nonnegativity constraints on each of the target
523
(18)and instrument variables.This gives to the system of equations and inequalities (1)
to (22) the form of alinear programming model.
Max CX [iA] XB
x





The linear programming form offers the great advantage that solutions to
both the primal and the dual can be obtainedeasily and quickly. If there existsa
feasible solution to either the primal or the dualproblem, there generally exists
an infinite number of solutionsfrom which an optimal solution can be chosen.
From the primal solution we can obtain theoptimal policy package (X). as well
as the maximum welfareattainable (CX'), given the constraints. From the dual
solution we obtain the optimal shadow prices(p*) representing the cost interms
of welfare of tightening each particular constraint by one unit. In this case the
shadow prices provide both (I) the trade-offs between each limitation on every
policy instrument and the welfare criterion (GNP) and (2) the trade-offs between
each of the other welfare goals (C, I, BP, and SG) and GNP. Since all the shadow
prices are relative prices, and since all are relative to the same standard (in this
case GNP), ratios of the different shadowprices of the different Constraints can also
be calculated. Thereby, a whole matrix of all the possible trade-off s between each
policy instrument and welfare goal can easily be obtained. These trade-offs are the
possibility-trade-offs. With knowledge about the possibiiity-trade-offs, the policy-
maker can choose the optimal policy mix by matching the possibility-trade-offs
with his desirahilitr-trade-offs.
11
Our present objective concerns only the primal solution. Specifically, we
wish to compare the welfare obtainable when complete coordination of policies
is possible among countries of the region (utilizing the full Central America model)
with that obtainable when no coordination of policy among CACM menthers is
possible (utilizing the separate national models). Therefore, we shall confine our
attention to the primal problem solutionsthe optimal values of the policy
instruments and especially of the target variables.
Using the model in the way we have just described for Central America as a
whole, we obtain the values for 1967 and 1968 given in the first two columns (i.e.,
the columns indicated "LPC unadjusted") of Table 4 from the optimal primal
solution to the linear programming model. The optimal solutions for the individual
country models are given in the second pair of columns (i.e., the columns indicated
"LP! unadjusted"). Note that in allcases the values of GNP and most of theother
This method was developed and applied in a somewhat different context in Nugent andDePrano.
t966 A general problem that arises is that this procedure is based on the incremental analysis and
pertains to discrete periods of time. This limits the model's ability to achieve much in the way offlne-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































target variables are larger inthe Central America model (in which the POlicies of
all countries are determinedsimultaneously) than in the single-country models (in
which the policies of each country aredctcrmincd separately).
However, the difference in these two setsofoptimal solution values is tiøt only
attributable to different approaches topolicy determination but also to the
estimation errors in the intraregionalimport equations (Ni)----the only equatiois
treated differently in the aggregate CentralAmerica model and in the individual.
country models. This stems fromthe fact that Ni variables of the other countries
are treated as exogenousvariables in the individual-country models but are, of
course, endogenous in the aggregateCentral America model. In the former set of
models no estimation error is involved, whereas in the latter model estimation error
is introduced. In order to account for this difference in treatment we have Computed
the difference in the values of the constant terms in the consolidated and abbreviated
reduced-form equations attributable to this source. We have then adjusted Le
original constant terms in the individual country models upward by the extent t
which the Central America model was overestimating each endogenous variabl
and downward by the extent to which the model was underestimating each endo-
genous variable. Conversely, the opposite set of adjustments can be made in the
constant terms of the Central America model to make the results comparable to
the unadjusted individual-country solutions. The optimal solutions obtained from
the adjusted individual-country models are now given in the second pairof
columns (those indicated by "LPI Adjusted") in each of the tables. Similarly, the
optimal solutions obtained from the adjusted Central America model are now
given in the fifth pair of columns (those indicated by "LPC Adjusted") in each of
these tables.
The solution values for the target variables from the first and second pairs of
columns are now comparable, inasmuch as the effect of estimation error in the Ni
equations has now been accounted for. Similarly, and for the same reasons, the
fourth and fifth pairs of columns are comparable. As the reader can easilysee,
without exception, when full coordination of policies among countries is possible
(as in the Central America model), higher targets are achievable than whenno
such coordination is possible.
However, it is still possible that our comparisons yield an overestimateof
the true benefit from regional coordination of macroeconomic policies in Central
America. This is because the individual-country optimizationswere computed
without the benefit of knowledge about the optimal policy decisions inthe other
countries, whereas complete coordination of policy in the Central America model
was sufficient to provide perfect information. One might wonder how much better
the individual countries might have been ableto perform with respect to their
goals if they had had perfect information about whatthe other countries were
doing at the optimum. We have recalculatedthe individual-country model
maximizations under conditions where each individualcountry knows the optimal
solutions of the other individualcountries by plugging optimal values of
Ni I(instead ofactualvalues) into the reduced-form coefficients in
arriving at the values of theconstant terms in the consolidated and abbreviated
reduced forms. The resultingconstant terms can either be left alone (unadjusted) or
can be adjusted to account for estimationerror in the Ni terms as before. The
526sets of optimal solutions for the individual-country models resulting fromthe
latter operation are sho'vn in the third pair of columns (indicated "LPI Adjusted
and Perfect Information").
The reader can easily see that the provision of perfect information generally
brings the values of the target variables from the noncoordinated policy models
(the individual-country models) somewhat closer to those obtained from ".LPC
unadjusted," the complete Central American model with complete coordination of
policy. However, the effect of perfect information is not generally very large--
accounting for only a small fraction of the differences between the comparable
solutions obtained under complete coordination of policy and in the absence of
such coordination.
To test lr the sensitivity of the results to changes in assumptions, parameter
values, and the political constraints, we have repeated the same procedures for
two different specifications of the macroeconometric models and also for alternative
sets of bounds on the flexibility of the policy instruments and secondary targets.
The results obtained in these alternative situations, as reported in full in Nugent
1974, indicate that the potential benefits of policy coordination among Central
American countries range from 2 to 7 percent of the region's GNP. The fact that
the results were generally fairly insensitive to any and all of these changes and that
the underlying models seemed to perform fairly satisfactorily in making forecasts
and "backcasts" give reason to believe that the findings of quite substantial
potential benefits of policy coordination may be fairly representative. As to the
distribution of the potential gains, among countries, the results indicate that
the smaller countries like Costa Rica and El Salvador would generally benefit
more than the large ones, and the richer ones more than the poorer ones like
Honduras.
The higher incomes are attributable to the fact that, with coordination, each
individual country is able to pursue more expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies than in the absence of coordination. For example, coordination makes it
possible for Costa Rica to follow more expansionary spending policies (higher
G and !g) and to lower its export and "other tax" rates (TelEx and To/GDP,
respectively) in return for a slightly less expansionary monetary policy (RM). El
Salvador is able to increase government spending in the current period (t) and
money supply in year t ± 1 at the cost of a slightly higher "other tax" rate To/GDP.
Similarly, Guatemala is able to trade oil' an increase in the "other tax" rate in
year t -- 1 for a reduction in the "other tax" rate in year t and an increase in
government spending in year r + I. Honduras is able to reduce its "other tax"
rate in yearand to raise government spending in year t + I. Finally, Nicaragua
is able to reduce its "other tax" rate in year t and lower its export tax rate in year
+ 1.
What these solutions reflect is that the greater flexibility derived from a
simultaneous solution for all countries allows the countries to trade off slack in
some of the less binding resources or constraints for additional flexibility in some of
the more binding ones.
Naturally, however, all of the above conclusions must still be regarded as
tentative until they can be corroborated by other researchers with a stronger
data base and more satisfactory models.
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SSOMu SUGGESTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING RESFARCEI ON
MACROECONOMETRIC' MOiwItN(; OF LDCs
Myown experience in building some admittedly primitive macroecOnonletric
models for policy planning purposes has led me to the following suggestjog
for how research of this sort should be organized ilit is to be SucccssfttFirst
macroeconometric model building must be an ongoing process. Presumably
because of lack of financing, roost efforts at model building in LDCs hac thusfar
been sporadic and discontinuous. It is heartening to find that one model fora
Latin American country (Beltran del Rio and Klein, 1973) has alreadygone
through at least five versions over a period of at least five years, and it shouldnot
surprising that the result has been quantitatively and qualitatively superiorto most
other models of LDCs. More funding should be made available forresearch of this
kind at the national, regional, and international levels.
Second, it is very difficult for any one model builder--or even team ofmodel
buildersto be completely "objective" in model formulation and therebyto do
justice to all possible policy positions. Therefore, in demonstrating thebenefits
and costs of alternative policy packages and development strategies,a strong
effort should be made to foster competition between different teams ofresearchers,
each with its own model and "vision" of the economy but all with thesame data
and probably the same estimation procedures.
Finally, a consortium of researchers in different countries shouldbe fostered
whereby the different national experiences in macroeconometrjcmodel building
could be shared and exchanged and the various national effortscould be assisted
with regional and international attempts to look at thesame processes from the
perspective of international cross sections of time series data.Some of the research
efforts might investigate the interdependencies betweencountries and develop
policy models capable of pointing out the benefits ofinternational cooperation,
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